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Abstract
In an important article published in this journal, Dryzek et al. (2011) champion the convocation of a deliberative global citi-
zens’ assembly (DGCA). In this article, I aim to further strengthen the case for a DGCA by addressing: (1) why a DGCA is likely
to take a long-term perspective in the global interest; and (2) why it is so vital that a global institution should do so. I start by
analyzing the nature of the issues requiring global policy. These issues, I will argue, are typically global cooperation problems.
Cooperation problems pose two major challenges. The ﬁrst is to prevent freeriding, that is, serving one’s immediate interests
at the expense of the global interest. The second is to align on an efﬁcient global policy. In both respects, I will argue, a DGCA
is a good candidate to yield desirable results (and is likely to do better than current supranational institutions).
Policy Implications
• The integration of a deliberative global citizens’ assembly in the UN.
• Solving global cooperation problems (such as climate change, poverty, mass migration, conﬂict and overpopulation)
requires us to solve inherent free rider and coordination problems. Current supranational institutions are ill-equipped to
do so.
• Citizens’ deliberation is well-suited to solve free rider and coordination problems.
• By acquiring legitimacy, a deliberative global citizens’ assembly could pressure sovereign nations to follow its recommen-
dations.
The case for a deliberative global citizens’
assembly
In an important article published in this journal, Dryzek
et al. (2011) argue that in order to address the democratic
deﬁcit in global governance – which is widely recognized as
they point out – we should consider a ‘deliberative global
citizens’ assembly’ (DGCA). In their article they target pro-
posals advancing alternatives such as a ‘popularly elected
global assembly’ (PEGA) (e.g. by Falk and Strauss, 2001).
Dryzek and colleagues offer a number of reasons why a
DGCA is preferable to a PEGA.
A DGCA, they argue, would be easier to accept for non-
democratic states – who would not have to hold elections
to provide delegates for the global parliament – and states
standing on their sovereignty – since it is less likely to be
perceived as a direct challenger of their national parliaments
(Dryzek et al, 2011). Moreover, it doesn’t pose a problem of
‘expressive voting’ in which voters would use elections for
the global parliament erroneously to pass judgment on their
national government. Finally, it could serve as a ‘focal point’,
making international politics in general more deliberative.
While these are all valid reasons, the most important one
they offer – in my opinion – is that: a global institution
needs to be able to take a long-term perspective and con-
sider the global good (Dryzek et al, 2011). A PEGA, they
point out, is not likely to take such a perspective because
elected and mandated representatives of states are likely to
focus on the short-term – the next elections – and view a
global assembly as a venue to further the interests of the
particular group they represent. A DGCA, to the contrary, is
likely to take a more long-term perspective. The participants,
as they point out, have no strong connection with their
state’s government. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests
that citizens’ deliberation often leads to proposals taking a
long-term perspective (Dryzek et al, 2011).
I fully agree with this analysis. In this paper, I aim to fur-
ther strengthen the case for a DGCA by addressing: (1) why
a DGCA is likely to take a long-term perspective in the glo-
bal interest; and (2) why it is so vital that a global institution
should do so. I start by analyzing the nature of the issues
requiring global policy. These issues, I will argue, are typi-
cally global cooperation problems. Cooperation problems
pose two major challenges. The ﬁrst is to prevent freeriding,
that is, serving one’s immediate interests at the expense of
the global interest. The second is to align on an efﬁcient
global policy. In both respects, I will argue, a DGCA is a
good candidate to yield desirable results (and is likely to do
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better than current supranational institutions). As signposted
earlier (1), in addition to pointing at the empirical evidence
in support of this claim, I will offer an explanation as to why
I believe this is the case.
In the following section, I describe the global cooperation
problems we are facing and the current failure to solve
these problems in an efﬁcient manner. In the third section, I
argue that the current institutional design of the UN (and of
other supranational institutions), which offer a platform for
‘inter-national’ negotiation, is the culprit. In the ﬁfth section,
I argue that the integration of a DGCA in the UN could help
to address these shortcomings. I support this claim by point-
ing out evidence from social experiments with deliberative
citizens’ assemblies and offer an analysis of why such delib-
erative citizens’ assemblies are better suited to deal with
(global) cooperation problems. In conclusion, I brieﬂy
address the realist concern that such an assembly would
wield no power over sovereign nations. I argue that its pro-
posals – even if advisory in nature – could gain the neces-
sary proverbial ‘teeth’ by acquiring legitimacy.
A vicious circle of global cooperation problems
Among other problems, climate change, poverty, mass
migration, overpopulation and conﬂict present us with a
vicious circle of global problems that mutually reinforce
each other. These problems are global problems not only
because they affect (directly or indirectly) all of humanity,
but also because they can only be dealt with efﬁciently at
the global level.1
Brieﬂy and grossly oversimplifying, climate change threat-
ens many people with destitution due to failing crop yield
and the rising sea level. This in turn would force those cli-
mate victims to migrate. According to the climate scientist
Norman Myers (2002), up to 200 million people could be
forced to migrate if the average global temperature would
rise to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial temperatures.
In a globalized world, however, people do not only migrate
to escape famine, they also migrate to wealthier countries
to escape relative poverty. Mass migration in turn keeps the
poorer regions from which many of the young and entre-
preneurial people migrate poor and creates tension (conﬂict)
in the host countries (Collier, 2013). The arrow between
migration and conﬂict points in both directions since con-
ﬂict, of course, leads to mass migration. Today almost 70
million of so-called refugees have ﬂed their home because
of armed conﬂicts.2 Conﬂict also leads to poverty and pov-
erty to conﬂict. This is called the ‘conﬂict trap’. Armed
conﬂicts destroy local economies and (mainly young and
male) people in poor regions will more easily take up arms
(not in the least because they are desperate and see it as a
means of survival). Poverty also leads to overpopulation. As
countries and regions within countries get wealthier they
typically witness a drop in fertility (especially if girls have
access to education). Overpopulation in turn keeps groups
in poverty and ﬁnally could exacerbate climate change in
the future. While at present – it is important to emphasize –
the bulk of greenhouse gas emission comes from rich,
industrial nations, a larger world population could lead to
increased fossil fuel burning, cattle raising and deforestation.
The way out of the vicious circle requires us to eradicate
poverty and prevent escalating climate change which are
the supply sources of the vicious circle described above. If
we control climate change and eradicate poverty, we pre-
vent mass migration and the conﬂict that follows in its wake
as well as unsustainable population growth which threatens
to burden our planet even more. Eradicating poverty and
dealing with climate change present us with a cooperation
problem at the global level (as does dealing with mass
migration). Cooperation problems arise when a commonly
beneﬁcial outcome requires us to coordinate on a successful
solution – which I refer to as a ‘coordination problem’ – or
to prevent freeriding by some of the actors involved –
which I refer to as a ‘free rider problem’. Freeriding occurs
when parties proﬁt from the effort of others without con-
tributing anything themselves, thereby preventing the group
beneﬁcial outcome of cooperation to materialize. Note that
cooperation problems do not fall neatly in one or the other
kind. In fact, most cooperation problems contain both coor-
dination and free rider problems.
With regard to poverty, the economist Jeffrey Sachs
(2005) has argued that the poorest countries are caught in a
‘poverty trap’. Due to a lack of resources, infrastructure,
technology and human capital, they cannot enrich them-
selves in the current global economy. Sachs estimates (writ-
ing in 2005) that it would cost around 175 billion dollars a
year to eliminate extreme poverty over time. According to
Sachs, given such a contribution, the poverty trap would lar-
gely disappear over time and the poorest countries could
end up in a positive spiral and be able to develop on their
own. Provided of course that the political leaders of the
developing countries implement sensible policies in the
interest of the citizens. Ironically, donations from developed
to developing countries total much more than the required
175 billion dollars. In 2017 ofﬁcial donations from developed
countries to developing countries totaled around 147 billion
dollars. Add to that charitable donations (by individuals,
foundations and corporations) which totaled 410 billion dol-
lars in 2017 and of which a sizable portion goes to develop-
ing countries and it should be clear that – if Sachs’
estimates are in the right ball park – there are actually
enough funds being donated to eradicate extreme poverty.3
While eradicating poverty is a complex and multifaceted
problem, one major issue preventing us from doing so is
that foreign aid lacks coordination. What ’USAID’ does in
terms of development is independent of what European
Climate change
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countries do and certainly to what China does. In addition
to a total lack of vision, this fragmentation also leads to very
high administrative costs. It makes aid depressingly inefﬁ-
cient. The need for international policy coordination has not
escaped the attention of the donor and developing coun-
tries. In 2005, an agreement was signed in Paris in which a
hundred ministers and representatives of aid organizations
promised to make efforts to increase the effectiveness of
development. Their main resolve was to strive for the har-
monization of policies and a result-oriented approach.4 So
far, however, they have not succeeded. Too often aid does
not result in economic development (Moyo, 2009; Rajan and
Subramanian, 2008).
An important reason for this lack of coordination leading
to ineffective aid, I will argue in the next section, is that the
context of international politics stands in the way of coordi-
nating global policy efﬁciently. This difﬁculty to coordinate
on a supranational level is also evident from the migration
crisis in Europe, in which EU countries prove unable to
agree on how to deal with and absorb the migration
stream. So, dealing with poverty (and migration) presents us
mainly with the challenge to coordinate the actions of many
different parties to achieve a common goal (since the cur-
rent donations should sufﬁce to eradicate poverty given a
coordinated and efﬁcient policy) but also harbor a free rider
problem (nations and other potential donors are still incen-
tivized in the short-term to restrict donations and keep the
funds for themselves or close their borders in the case of
migration, thereby freeriding on the effort of other nations
to deal with these issues).
Climate change, on the other hand, presents us with a free
rider problem. While reducing the emission of greenhouse
gasses is in the long-term interest of all nations, they do nev-
ertheless proﬁt in the short-term by not bearing any costs in
reducing emission (such as reducing industrial activity that
emits CO2, investing in technology that harvests climate-
friendly energy or in the research on new ways to harvest cli-
mate-friendly energy). To deal with climate change we must
therefore devise global policy measures in the long-term
interests of all of the stakeholders of this planet and prevent
freeriding by actors heeding their short-term economic inter-
ests (e.g. ensuring that all or at least the great majority of
nations agree to contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sion). Free rider problems, however, typically also contain
coordination problems. In addition to preventing freeriding,
the actions of all parties involved must be coordinated to
achieve forceful global action in the light of the climate crisis.
Today freeriding in the context of the climate crisis is
rampant. Since 1995, 24 climate summits have been orga-
nized and the result can only be described as disappointing.
The last summit in Katowice ended on a disillusion note: we
would no longer strive for an increase of ‘only’ 1.5 degrees
above pre-industrial world temperature, but for an increase
of 2 degrees. The reason is simply that many nations do not
want to bear the necessary costs to deal with the threat
effectively. Again, the culprit – I will argue in the next sec-
tion – is the institutional design in which international poli-
tics operate.
Diagnosis: the failure of inter-national negotiation
In order to solve these global cooperation problems, we need
a global institution that orchestrates global cooperation in the
long-term global interest. It must outline the way nations are
to coordinate their actions and prevent freeriding from
nations. Thanks to the global institutions we have today – the
United Nations in the ﬁrst place, but also global institutions
such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) – many initia-
tives for global cooperation have been undertaken (e.g. sum-
mits to deal with climate change and to eradicate poverty).
The UN is an institution with much merit, not in the least
because of its important contribution to making our era the
most peaceful era in human history. Nevertheless, it often fails
to deal with global cooperation problems effectively.
The root cause of these failures, I believe, lies with the
current institutional design of the UN (and other suprana-
tional institutions such as the NATO and the EU). They offer
a platform for ‘inter-national’ negotiation by representatives
of nations (or other political units). Global conferences such
as climate COPs (conferences of parties) bring together dele-
gates from nations who negotiate with each other on the
course of action to take. This, I will argue, prevents an efﬁ-
cient solution to these global cooperation problems. It cre-
ates incentives and a dynamic which predictably lead to
outcomes which are not in the global long-term interest. On
the one hand it creates an incentive to free ride (it falls
short of solving free rider problems), on the other hand it
often stands in the way of reaching an agreement on how
to tackle the issues at stake (it falls short of solving coordi-
nation problems).
An incentive to free ride
The representatives negotiating with each other on global
policy, are typically (but not exclusively) elected politicians
or diplomats mandated by elected politicians. The electoral
system in force in democratic countries – which make up
the majority of inﬂuential countries in those meetings (but
by no means all inﬂuential countries, consider China and
Russia) – holds those representatives accountable to the
population of the nation they represent. If public opinion
turns against them, they stand to lose the upcoming elec-
tions. This, of course, is a virtue of democratic governance: it
prevents kleptocratic regimes. However, when it comes to
international politics and dealing with global free rider prob-
lems, this virtue often turns into a vice. In such a context,
politicians are incentivized to negotiate in the short-term
interests of the group they represent, not in their long-term
interest let alone in the global long-term interest. Agreeing
to introduce taxes on CO2 emission or impose other mea-
sures of austerity, for instance, can turn public opinion
against a politician. This problem is exacerbated by the
competitive context of party-based democracy in which
other parties can be expected to rally up protest against
such ‘unpopular’ policies in an attempt to gain market share
on the electoral market.
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Leaders of non-democratic nations, however, are equally
prone to devise policy in the short-term interests of their
group. While they do not face the uncertainty of re-election
and electoral competition, they do risk being overthrown.
This often leads them to focus on the short term, as Dryzek
et al. (2011) rightly point out. This averseness to inforce poli-
cies which are costly in the short-term (but beneﬁcial in the
long-term) is evident from the way most nations have been
handling the climate issue. Often (but not always) they will
pay lip service to the importance of dealing with climate
change and insuring a prosperous and safe future for all,
but when push comes to shove these intentions and pro-
mises are (in many cases) not turned into actual greenhouse
gas emission cutting efforts for fear of losing public support.
The latest UN climate change conference or ‘Conference of
the Parties (COP) 24’ – at the time writing this article – held
in Katowice showed once again that despite important
efforts by some of the delegates to tackle the issue head
on, international disagreement prevents this. They did agree
on a rulebook to implement the 2015 Paris agreement, but
once again postponed pledging to implement the necessary
reforms to meet the targets set in Paris.5
Predictably, when nations pursue short-term (economic)
group interests, we get what Hardin (1968) famously called
a ‘tragedy of the commons’. When faced with a common
good (such as the climate), self-interested actors (seeking to
maximize their personal beneﬁt) will deplete that common
good to the detriment of all. Suppose there is a pasture that
can sustain a hundred sheep. Ten shepherds use the pasture
and each shepherd has ten sheep. Adding more sheep
would cause to pasture to be overgrazed and ultimately to
turn into a wasteland. Nevertheless, each shepherd will still
beneﬁt from adding another sheep. This generates a sub-
stantial increase in income (10% more wool) and only a rela-
tively small cost (1% less grass for his sheep). Shepherds
aiming to maximize their individual payoff will therefore
increase their livestock beyond the capacity of the pasture
leading to the demise of this common good. The problem is
that the cost (of adding another animal) is shared by the
entire group, while the beneﬁt (of adding another animal) is
reaped by each individual shepherd.6
In order to prevent such a tragedy of the commons, two
conditions must obtain. First, (most of) the actors must real-
ize the predicament they are in. They must be aware of the
importance of preserving the common good and be willing
to preserve it. Second, these actors must know that (most
of) the other actors involved are aware of this and are also
willing to undertake the necessary measures to preserve the
common good. Otherwise, their actions to preserve the
common good would be (perceived as) futile and they will
no longer want to bear the costs to preserve the common
good. What needs to happen, in other words, is that most
involved actors take a long-term perspective and cooperate
(refrain from freeriding) in order to preserve the common
good and this will only happen if they can count on the
others to cooperate as well. This mutual cooperation in the
long-term interest of all is impeded by the current institu-
tional context in which international politics operate. The
tragedy of the commons that’s unfolding before our eyes is
not so much caused by the callous, short-sighted or
immoral nature of the people in charge but – as pointed
out above – by the incentives of those representatives cre-
ated by the political context in which they operate (Vlerick,
2019).
The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that the
interests of nations are not entirely aligned. With regard to
the climate issue, the short-term interests of industrial
countries depending on fossil fuel for their industrial activi-
ties in general and of fossil fuel producing countries in
particular are manifestly not aligned with the interests of
certain small island groups (such as the Solomon Islands)
with little to gain from fossil fuel usage (since there’s little
industrial activity) and much to lose (since they face the
immediate threat of disappearing below the surface of the
sea in the next few decennia because of rising sea levels
caused by climate change). Nations that have more to lose
than other nations with the implementation of certain poli-
cies, often oppose themselves to these policies (even if
adopting these policies would be in their long-term inter-
est) because they do not want to be at ‘the losing end’ of
the negotiation.
Obstacles to coordinate on a global policy
The destructive dynamic of international negotiation does
not only create freeriding (refusing to bear the necessary
short-term costs in the global long-term interests), it also
hinders agreement on a global policy. Take the ongoing
negotiation between developing and developed countries
on how to fund the necessary measures to tackle climate
change. At the 2009 Copenhagen COP, developing countries
generally insisted on public funding, while developed coun-
tries pushed for market mechanisms (CO2 taxes) and private
funding. Moreover, they disagree on the issue of intellectual
property rights. Should technological innovations for har-
vesting green energy or otherwise reducing CO2 emission
typically developed in industrialized countries be made
freely available to developing countries or should intellec-
tual property rights be maintained (Dimitrov, 2010)?
When it comes to the difﬁculty to coordinate global
efforts to deal with global problems, the current context of
inter-national negotiation is not only problematic because
the short-term interests of nations diverge, but also – per-
haps even more so – because of the incentives of the repre-
sentatives involved. Representatives go to these
negotiations with a lot of baggage. Often they have publicly
defended the way they believe these problems should be
tackled: ‘we’ll do things this way’. Even if they haven’t, they
rarely enter the negotiation with an open perspective. They
are often linked to political parties, by being members of a
political party themselves or (more commonly) by being
mandated by elected members of parties carrying out exec-
utive functions. Those political parties typically have pre-
established views on how to deal with the issues at stake.
Different parties are often divided along ideological lines
and consequently propose substantially different ways of
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tackling similar problems. Neo-liberal parties will have differ-
ent views on how to allocate the costs for curbing green-
house gas emission than socialist parties. The former may
be wary of imposing too many restrictions on companies
while the latter will mainly worry about the consequences
of policies (such as increasing taxes on gasoline) that might
affect citizens with modest means. Unsurprisingly, represen-
tatives of different parties, taking different ideological lines,
have a hard time agreeing on policies. This, of course, does
not mean that agreement cannot be reached between dif-
ferent party representatives, merely that ties with parties
can impede agreement between representatives.
Even more so, in the context of competitive party democ-
racy, politicians from different parties actually have an
incentive to disagree with each other. They compete for
votes trying to convince voters that their program is differ-
ent and better than what other parties have on offer. This is
exacerbated by heavily mediatized public debates where
these politicians affront each other and attempt to ‘win’ the
debate. This does not only complicate efﬁcient policy mak-
ing on a national level, but also on a global level since these
ideological divides run across countries and are no less pre-
sent on the international scene.
If anything, agreement is further complicated in an inter-
national context because of ideological differences between
nations. Representatives from the more liberal United States
could easily clash on policy with those of the more socially
inclined Scandinavian countries and with those of more
authoritarian countries such as China. International politics
often leads to discord because all parties want to impose
their own ‘social contract’ – their own way of organizing the
cooperative effort to deal with the issues at hand (see Vler-
ick, 2019, forthcoming). As Robert Putnam (1988) rightly
points out in his ‘two-level games’ model, international
negotiation simultaneously consists of two negotiations: the
ﬁrst is negotiation at the domestic level and the second is
negotiation at the international level. Representatives of
nations must ﬁrst negotiate with other stakeholders (e.g.
pressure groups) and government ofﬁcials of their nation to
determine the national interests. These preceding (domestic)
negotiations determine which outcome(s) of the interna-
tional negotiation will be acceptable to negotiating repre-
sentatives. International agreement can only ensue if there
is an overlap in acceptable outcomes for all representatives.
Such an overlap does not always exist and if it exists it often
concerns policy proposals that end up being inefﬁcient
because too many compromises have been made to make
them acceptable for all.
This difﬁculty to coordinate on an efﬁcient global policy
does not only affect dealing with climate change but also
with poverty. While tremendous progress has been made in
eradicating poverty in the last decennia.7 There are still
some 736 million people living in extreme poverty today8
and many more in relative poverty. The main obstacle to
efﬁciently eradicating poverty is not – as pointed out above
– a lack of altruism displayed by afﬂuent nations and peo-
ple, but – among other things such as the structure of the
global political economy – a lack of coordination.
A solution: citizens’ deliberation at the global
level
In order to address the pressing global cooperation prob-
lems, we need efﬁcient global policy in the long-term inter-
est of all stakeholders. Currently this is impeded by the
context of international politics shaped by our global and
supra-national institutions which provide a platform for
international negotiation by representatives of nations. In
order to overcome the free rider problems and lack of coor-
dination that plague current international politics, we need
to address the current institutional design. The proposal
advanced by Dryzek et al. (2011) to erect a DGCA is particu-
larly promising in this light. It provides – I will argue – the
key to solving both kinds of cooperation problems (free
rider and coordination problems) that currently stand in the
way of successful global cooperation.
Solving free rider problems
Dryzek et al. (2011, p. 38) state that: ‘While there are no
guarantees, we would expect a DGCA to adhere more clo-
sely [in comparison to a PEGA] to long-term considerations
and bring global public goods to the fore’. In other words,
they expect deliberating citizens to put forward policy that
is less likely to free-ride on the common good (and produce
a tragedy of the commons) than when policy is left to a par-
liament of elected politicians. This point has been repeatedly
stressed by scholars writing on deliberative forms of democ-
racy. They emphasize the importance of deliberation in this.
According to O’Flynn (2010, p. 301) ‘deliberative democracy
is well placed to deliver the public interest’. The reason he
offers in support of this claim is that deliberation ‘obliges us
to take a broader or more encompassing view of important
decisions of law or policy than merely consulting our own
special interest in them’ (O’Flynn, 2010, p. 307). In a similar
vein, Young (2002, p. 26) claims that deliberation ‘promotes
cooperation’ and ‘solves collective problems’.9 This is not
mere conjecture. As Dryzek and colleagues point out (2011,
p. 38): ‘many empirical studies on citizens’ deliberation show
that as soon as participants start making an effort in seri-
ously listening and take a respectful attitude toward other
positions and arguments, their own thinking is increasingly
enlarged in both time and space’. Meaning that they take
the interests of a larger group of people into consideration
and consider the long(er) term.
This was clearly the case in the ﬁrst multinational and lar-
gescale initiative of citizens’ deliberation on the climate
issue. The project was called ‘World Wide Views on Climate
and Energy’ and took place a few months before the UN cli-
mate summit in Paris in 2015.10 Groups of citizens spread
over the globe were informed about climate change (causes,
potential solutions, etc.) through videos and deliberated on
how to deal with the climate issue. The measures proposed
by these deliberating groups of citizens generally went well
beyond the guidelines proposed by the UN summit a few
months later. Remarkably, in contrast to (many of) the repre-
sentatives in the UN summit in Paris, the vast majority of
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participants put their group interests aside. No less than 79
per cent of the participating citizens felt that their country
should take strong measures to tackle climate change even
if other countries did not.
Given these promising ﬁndings from social experiments
with citizens’ deliberation and the fact that our current
democratic systems are poorly equipped to deal with a
complex global problem such as climate change, we should
– as Dryzek and Niemeyer (2019) forcefully advocate in their
recent paper – consider the implementation of such deliber-
ative ‘mini-publics’ in existing global governing bodies. The
question remains why citizens’ deliberation does not exhibit
the same shortcomings as negotiation between representa-
tives of nations. After all, citizens also have a self-interest
and belong to certain nations. Why don’t they pursue their
own interests and that of the particular group to which they
belong (or at least not to same extent as representatives
do)? How come they seem more prone to take a long-term
perspective in the global interests? Three important factors,
I believe, contribute to this.
First of all, citizens are not subject to the same kind of
damaging incentives as professional politicians. They do not
need to please their home electorate in the short-term in
order to be re-elected. Second, the dynamics of deliberation
are fundamentally different from the dynamics of negotia-
tion. Whereas the latter take the form of what Steiner (2012,
p. 4) calls ‘strategic bargaining’ in which the actors typically
have ﬁxed preferences ‘and maneuver to arrive at an out-
come that is as close as possible to their preferences’, the
former (ideally) takes the form of an open-minded exchange
of ideas, views and arguments. It leads to mutual justiﬁca-
tion (Mansbridge et al, 2010) rather than deal making. In
such a context, participants are forced to reﬂect upon the
positions they advocate and justify them to their fellow par-
ticipants (with different interests and backgrounds). This
makes it harder to maintain and defend positions that are
self-interested or only in the interest of the particular group
one belongs too. It also makes it harder to defend positions
that are beneﬁcial in the short-term but detrimental in the
long-term. This is not mere conjecture, as Dryzek et al.,
(2011) point out, analysis of the dynamics of citizens’ delib-
erations show that such deliberation often produces a shift
toward considerations aimed at preserving public goods
and considerations taking into account the interests of
others and society as a whole.
Finally, there is the diversity of the group of deliberating
citizens (ensured by random sampling). This strengthens the
virtues of deliberation, often leading people to adopt more
long-term views in the interest of a wider circle of stake-
holders. On the one hand, it exposes the participants to the
views and interests of people in very different positions (be
it because of socio-economic gaps, cultural background, dif-
ference in gender, age, etc.). On the other hand, since par-
ticipants need to justify their position to others with
diverging interests, they have to take the interests of these
people into consideration if they want to be successful. Pro-
posals that go radically against the interests of others within
the assembly do not stand a chance.
Interestingly, in this regard, deliberation appears to be a
very effective means to bridge ideological divides in highly
divided societies. According to Gutmann and Thompson
(1998) deliberation generally leads to a better understanding
of the views of others and ultimately to more tolerance for
those views. A number of empirical studies support this
claim. Under the right conditions, deliberation has been
shown to bridge ethnic, linguistic and other divides (Dryzek,
2005; O’Flynn, 2017; Steiner, 2012; Ugarriza and Caluwaerts,
2014). Deliberation, it seems, has the power to open our
perspectives even to the viewpoints of people we originally
met with suspicion or even hostility.
Solving coordination problems
In order to deal with global cooperation problems, we
must not only solve the inherent free rider problems they
present us with, but also the inherent coordination prob-
lems. In this regard too, a DGCA seems promising. In any
case, more promising than the current international politi-
cal context plagued by a difﬁculty to agree on particular
global policies. Empirical data suggest that citizen’s deliber-
ation often yields a high degree of consensus around cer-
tain solutions. According to Dryzek (2009, p. 1390) ‘a large
public policy literature points to the effectiveness of delib-
eration on the part of those concerned with a common
problem in generating solutions that are both effective
and mutually acceptable’ (my italics). In a similar vein, Stei-
ner (2012) concludes from his survey of empirical studies
on deliberation that under favorable conditions (such as a
relatively even distribution of initial positions among the
deliberators) deliberation helps to reach consensus deci-
sions.
Incidentally, this was also the case with the World Wide
Views on Climate and Energy.11 Not only did the delibera-
tions generally lead to proposals that went well beyond
those advanced by the representatives a few months later
in the climate summit in Paris (see above), the degree of
consensus achieved was also considerably higher than
among the politicians and diplomats. This, of course, doesn’t
mean that a full consensus is typically achieved in delibera-
tive citizens’ assemblies, let alone strived for. The latter can
be undesirable as some scholars point out (e.g. Hansen,
2004; Steiner, 2012) since it could create pressure on dis-
senting minorities. It merely means that proposals emanat-
ing from citizens’ deliberation often seem to have a
relatively large support base in the group of deliberating cit-
izens.12 Again, we have to ask ourselves why? Why do delib-
erating citizens seem to have an easier time agreeing on
policy than negotiating representatives?
A number of important factors, I believe, contribute to
this. First, in contrast to elected politicians and diplomats,
randomly selected citizens are free from political allegiances
or ties. They do not take directives from political parties
who have an incentive to disagree with the views and ideo-
logical lines of other political parties. They are free to make
up their own minds after having been well-informed by
experts.
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Second, randomly selected citizens are not only free
from political ties but also from public opinions. Public
commitment to a point of view (taking a public stance in
certain matters as professional politicians are required to
do) makes people more resistant to moderating their views
in the light of subsequent argument. As MacCoun (2006)
points out, this is a basic ﬁnding in social psychology.
Moreover, politicians are often criticized for not sticking to
their opinions (Steiner, 2012). This makes them even less
likely to be swayed by good arguments and agree with
other politicians. To avoid this issue in citizens’ delibera-
tion, Chambers (2005) argues that such deliberations proﬁt
from taking place behind closed doors. This protects the
deliberators from ‘the harmful effects of the glare of pub-
licity’. Deliberating in private makes it easier for partici-
pants to be swayed by good arguments and coordinate on
promising policy proposals. Chambers does, however, point
out that citizens’ deliberation should be transparent to the
public at large in order for their proposals to carry legiti-
macy and looks for ways to reconcile both (e.g. by intro-
ducing transparency and publicity later or elsewhere in the
process, as is also suggested by Goodin (2005) and Dryzek
(2009)).
Third, citizens’ deliberation is more likely to yield agree-
ment on policy proposals than negotiation between repre-
sentatives of nations because they engage in deliberation
rather than negotiation. While the inherent strategic bar-
gaining in negotiation (Steiner, 2012) can of course (and
sometimes does) lead to an agreement, the context of delib-
eration is more geared towards reaching agreement than
the context of negotiation. Whereas deliberation consists of
justifying one’s points of view and evaluating the justiﬁca-
tions of others, negotiation is more a matter of attempting
to have one’s own (ﬁxed) preferences reﬂected as much as
possible in the outcome (i.e. in the policy). The latter often
prevents an agreement (which is clearly the case in the
negotiations on the climate issue, as pointed out above).
Parties that feel duped – that is, they believe are unable to
have their ﬁxed interests reﬂected in the policy – will often
block the process of coming to a global policy by sticking
to their position. While this predicament could of course
also befall deliberating citizens – a sizable minority of partic-
ipants could be strongly opposed to what the majority pro-
poses – and the deliberation would therefore fall short of
reaching its goal, namely to put forward a proposal that is
at least acceptable to all participants – social experiments
with citizens’ deliberation indicate that this is not common-
place (Dryzek, 2009).
A fourth aspect that contributes to that is the cross-cul-
tural similarity in fairness norms. Since ordinary citizens are
typically not (publicly) committed to certain points of view
and political ideologies, they tend to evaluate the argu-
ments of others in terms of fairness. There is good evidence
that people in all cultures have a similar sense of fairness
(and accord much importance to it) (Vlerick, 2017; Vlerick,
2019). In all cultures fairness is associated with the equal
distribution of resources and/or the distribution of rewards
in function of one’s contribution (Tomasello, 2005). Binmore
(1994, 1998, 2005) argues that these fairness intuitions are
innate. Humans possess what Binmore calls ‘a deep struc-
ture of fairness’ (an innate sense of fairness) with which they
evaluate the behavior and opinions of others. The innate
origin of fairness norms is supported by studies on young
children showing that they harbor a number of intuitions
about distributive fairness they couldn’t have absorbed
through cultural learning. Young children share spoils
equally with peers after having cooperated to obtain the
goods even if they could easily monopolize the goods (War-
neken et al, 2011), understand and defend the entitlement
of others (Schmidt et al., 2013), understand fair as equal
(Wittig et al., 2013), and give less to free riders than to
cooperators (Melis et al., 2013).
Since this sense of fairness is universally shared, it pro-
vides a common ground for agreeing on policy proposals.
Fair proposals can and often will be recognized as such by
all participants regardless of their cultural background or
political preferences. In short, in the absence of strong ideo-
logical barriers dividing participants (as is often the case
with politicians and diplomats), deliberating citizens evaluate
proposals with a shared set of (intuitive) fairness norms and
are likely to coordinate on proposals that are detected as
fair.
An existing proposal
Dryzek et al. (2011) aren’t the only one’s championing the
convocation of a DGCA. Recently, Vergne, Schecter, Van Rey-
brouck, Bouley de Santiago, Walker, and Bouricius have
worked out in quite some detail how citizens’ deliberation
could be organized at the global scale. In their proposal, ﬁrst
national or regional citizens’ assemblies are held. Partici-
pants are randomly selected by sortition, ensuring that the
group of deliberating citizens is representative of the popu-
lation of the nation or the region they are selected from in
terms of age, gender, ethnicity, cultural background, socio-
economic status, etc. These regional assemblies are com-
posed of 50 to 1,500 people, depending on the size of the
region or the country.
Before the start of these deliberations, the agenda should
be set. Given the complexity of the global issues at stake, I
think it is advisable that every iteration leading up to the
DGCA would be devoted to a single global cooperation
problem. The important but limited task of setting the
agenda (determining the global issue that will be discussed)
should be integrated in the process. In their proposal,
Vergne and colleagues suggest organizing an ‘agenda coun-
cil’. This council would be composed of around 200 mem-
bers drafted by lot from the world citizens who have been
selected to participate in the regional councils.
Once the agenda has been set, the various assemblies are
informed by experts on the (global) issue at stake. These
experts, it is important to note, should be selected by the
members of the assemblies themselves to prevent a biased
selection of experts. After being thoroughly informed, vari-
ous interest groups such as lobbyists, NGOs, industry and
nations have the opportunity to propose and justify their
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researched solutions. Finally, the assemblies start deliberat-
ing with one another on possible solutions.
After the national and regional citizens’ assemblies took
place, the global citizens’ assembly – composed of 800 citi-
zens which are randomly selected from the national and
regional assemblies – is organized. As is the case in the
national assemblies, citizens deliberate in groups of six to
ten. Subsequently, the proposals emanating from these
round tables of deliberating citizens are presented to the
entire group with the aim of reaching a high degree of con-
sensus around the most popular proposals. By ﬁrst organiz-
ing national assemblies from which the participants to the
global assembly are (randomly) selected, the deliberation
indirectly includes many more citizens than can realistically
be brought together in a single assembly. This beneﬁts the
global citizens’ assembly on an epistemic level: many more
people are involved in coming up with creative proposals to
deal with the issues at hand. It also beneﬁts the legitimacy
of that assembly, since it involves the indirect input of a
much larger representative sample than those 800 citizens
who will ultimately participate to the global citizens’ assem-
bly.
Finally, between 100 and 300 citizens are randomly
selected from the global citizens’ assembly to participate in
an oversight council in order to discuss how the whole pro-
cess could be improved and how to implement these
improvements in the next iteration. That way it becomes a
self-learning process that improves over time. The cost of
the entire process has been estimated at 4 million euro (per
iteration). This, as they point out, should not be a major
problem since the yearly budget of the UN is substantial
enough.
Importantly, Vergne and colleagues propose to integrate
such an assembly in the UN. They do not propose to replace
any existing institutions with a DGCA. Rather, they argue, a
DGCA should be ‘bolted on’ to existing institutions. I follow
them wholeheartedly in this. It is, I believe, neither realistic
nor desirable to replace existing institutions in a revolution-
ary way by a DGCA. The aim is to strengthen the global
institutional level in the light of pressing global problems.
Dismantling important existing global institutional structures
would do the opposite.
Many issues with which UN institutions are concerned
would fall beyond the scope of a DGCA. Since the ‘raison
d’e^tre’ of a DGCA is to improve policy in those areas of glo-
bal governance that are faced with (global) cooperation
problems, the DGCA should only be concerned with such
problems. The policy proposals emanating from the DGCA
would then be carefully communicated (and justiﬁed) to the
members of other national and international organizations
concerned with these problems (e.g. climate COPs), world
governments and the population at large. This, as I will
address below, is crucially important for the policy proposals
to acquire legitimacy and carry the necessary weight.
While digging any deeper into the details of this proposal
is beyond the scope of this paper, I hope that including it
makes the case for a DGCA more tangible (and highlights
its feasibility).
Conclusion
The convocation of a DGCA, I have argued, would be a
promising course of action to reinforce global governance in
the face of global cooperation problems, such as climate
change and poverty. Those problems require solving inher-
ent free rider and cooperation problems and a DGCA is
well-suited to solve both. However, as any political realist
will undoubtedly immediately point out, heads of state may
very well ignore the proposals of such a DGCA. Given the
sovereignty of states these proposals would not be binding
to nations. How then is a DGCA going to prevent nations
from ‘defecting’, pursuing their own short-term self-interest
at the detriment of the long-term global interests? What
could incite sovereign nations to follow the recommenda-
tions of such a global institution?
I believe that the extent to which nations are prone to
follow such recommendations, depends crucially on the per-
ception of the legitimacy of the global institution from
which they emanate as well as the perception of the legiti-
macy of the recommendations themselves. When the pro-
cess through which these proposals come about is widely
perceived as a legitimate process, leaders of nations (and
representatives of nations seated in international organiza-
tions) can be expected to be pressured to follow these pro-
posals. This in turn requires the process to be transparent to
the public at large and that process to be perceived as fair.
Bridging the gap between the ‘deliberating microcosm’ and
the population at large is a crucial, challenging but not
insurmountable requirement for well-functioning citizens’
deliberation, as Fishkin (2009) points out. In order to be
legitimate and to be perceived as such, a DGCA must strive
for (and succeed to a certain extent in realizing) the Haber-
masian ideal of equal and unconstrained participation of all
of its participants (which make up a sample that is represen-
tative for the world population) (Habermas, 1996).
In democratic nations, the electorate can readily pressure
their leaders to follow directives they consider to be legiti-
mate and in their long-term interests. In non-democratic
nations, which still govern over some 3 billion people,13
there is no or little electoral pressure. However, the popula-
tion can and does still exert pressure on the people in
power (ever more so in fact in the digital era where citizens
have the means of coordinating political action through
social media and platforms), since they may have the power
to overthrow governments or at least threaten the regime
with instability (Dryzek et al, 2011). Whether people in
power will be pressured by their citizens into following the
global directives emanating from a DGCA, however, also
depends on the perceived legitimacy of the directives them-
selves.
The inﬂuence of a DGCA will, therefore, crucially depend
on the transparent communication of its modus operandi
(legitimacy of the process) and of its proposals as well as
the reasons for those proposals. Justiﬁcation is not only key
within the deliberative assembly, but also in communicating
the proposals to the population at large. Equally important
to their legitimacy, of course, is the quality of the proposed
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solutions to the issues at stake. In this context too, the
empirical evidence on citizens’ deliberation stems hopeful.
Given enough diversity in the sample of deliberating citizens
– which would be the case in a representative sample of
the world population – citizens’ deliberation can be
expected to lead to well thought out proposals (Fishkin,
2009; Landemore, 2013; Mercier and Landemore, 2012). In
fact, as Hong and Page (2004) forcefully claim: diversity
trumps ability. A diverse sample of moderately competent
individuals will often outperform a group of experts. Cogni-
tive diversity, Page concludes (2007), contributes more to
the competence of the group than individual ability.
For a DGCA to acquire the necessary legitimacy to incite
nations to follow its directives would take time. Even in the
best of scenarios, this can be expected to take a consider-
able number of iterations. That it should eventually do so, is
of course not guaranteed. But, provided that the proper
communication channels are set up between the deliberat-
ing microcosm, the world leaders and the population at
large, a DGCA could – I ﬁrmly believe – grow into a global
institution with substantial inﬂuence on national policies.
Moreover, as Dryzek et al. (2011) point out (and as I have
mentioned in the introduction) proposals of a DGCA could
be met with less resistance by nations standing on their
sovereignty and non-democratic nations than those of alter-
natives such as a PEGA. All of these considerations make it
the best candidate to my knowledge to deal with the press-
ing global cooperation problems of our time.
Notes
1. The particular conﬁguration outlined in the diagram serves to illus-
trate the global nature of major societal problems and their inter-
connectedness. This brief and illustrative overview is not meant to
be exhaustive of global problems, nor does it claim to have the
ﬁnal say about the interconnection of the problems mentioned.
2. Source: UNHCR (The UN Refugee Agency) - http://www.unhcr.org/ne
ws/stories/2017/6/5941561f4/forced-displacement-worldwide-its-
highest-decades.html
3. Sources:https://public.tableau.com/views/AidAtAGlance/DACmembe
rs?:embed=y&:display_count=no?&:showVizHome=no#1https://
www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content.view&cpxml:id=42
4. Source: https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf
5. Sources: https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop24-key-outcomes-agreed-
at-the-un-climate-talks-in-katowice andhttps://www.politico.eu/artic
le/5-takeaways-from-the-cop24-global-climate-change-summit-pola
nd-katowice/
6. This of course is a highly idealized example of a tragedy of the
commons. Its only purpose is to clarify the concept. It does not rep-
resent any past or present situation. In fact, small pastoral commu-
nities typically avoid a tragedy of the commons (and have done so
in the past) by abiding by commonly agreed upon rules of usage of
the common resource.
7. Source: https://ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty
8. source: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/09/
19/decline-of-global-extreme-poverty-continues-but-has-slowed-
world-bank
9. Note that these authors do not write about citizens’ deliberation in
particular but about deliberation in democratic decision making in
general.
10. Source: http://climateandenergy.wwviews.org/.
11. Source: http://climateandenergy.wwviews.org/.
12. At least, that is what an admittedly relatively small sample of exper-
imental studies on citizens’ deliberation suggests. More research is
needed to further test this claim.
13. Source: https://ourworldindata.org/democracy.
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